Parental Behaviour, Child Protection and the Removal of Children From Their Families: Evaluating the Threshold for State Intervention in 21st Century Britain by De Cruz, SP
– International Family Law, Policy and Practice • Vol. 5.1 •Spring 2017 • page 19 –
How should the State best protect children fromsuffering significant harm perpetrated within their ownfamilies?  Is the State justified in removing babies from
their mothers at birth, in accordance with a set of  statutory
rules? Should the State have this far-reaching power where
judges are empowered to remove babies at birth according
to statutory criteria which are not fully defined and open
to different interpretations? Are such court-ordered
removals in the best interests   of  the welfare of  the child?
Do they in turn do irreparable harm to the mother?  These
are deep and searching questions which demand deep and
searching investigation, carefully targeted research, and
critical and well-informed analysis. 
However, this article focuses on just one aspect of  this
practice, namely the relatively recent spate of  cases where
the number of  such compulsory removals by lower courts
appears to have reached a new high which raises questions
about their justification and moral acceptability.  The case
of  Nottingham City Council v LW and others2 is examined as it
purports to give judicial guidance on how long a Local
Authority is permitted to wait before issuing care
proceedings for the removal of  a new born baby, where the
evidence indicates that the statutory threshold for such
removal appears to have been crossed.   Having surveyed
seminal case-law, suggestions for reform are made as to
what can be done to address the manifold problems which
beset this area of  law and social work practice. 
Striking a balance
A crucial difficulty with this area of  social work and the
law is the perceived need by the State to strike a balance
between respecting the rights of  parents and protecting
children from significant harm. This constant goal has
evolved because of  the history of  the investigation of  child
abuse in this country.  Reported and well-documented cases
dating back to the early 1970s have seen an abundance of
instances where the State (through their child protection
agencies) has repeatedly failed to intervene in time to save
a child from serious physical abuse and eventual death,
going back to Maria Colwell in 1973, stretching across the
decades to Victoria Climbie in 2000 and Baby P (Peter
Connelly) in 2009. There have been at least 40 child abuse
Inquiries where the basic facts have been the same –local
authorities and other welfare services failing to notice a
child showing signs of  being physically abused until the
child eventually died from that persistent abuse. The solitary
high-profile exception was the series of  incidents involving
alleged sexual abuse of  a child in 1986-7 in Cleveland,
where it is surmised that between 121 and 165 children
were removed from their homes in a council estate, over a
period of  several months and taken to Middlesbrough
General Hospital where their parents were denied access to
them until their cases were heard in court. 
The Threshold for Intervention
This is contained in s.31(2) of  the Children Act 1989,
which stipulates that a care or supervision order may be
made by a Court if  it is satisfied that the child concerned is
suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm and the harm
or likelihood of  harm is attributable to the care given to the
child not being what is reasonable to expect a parent to give
that child or the child is beyond parental control. 
The	Elements	of	the	Threshold	requirements
The two key elements of  the threshold requirements are
the existence of  significant harm (present or future) and,
by virtue of  s.31(10) of  the Children Act 1989, the
treatment of  a ‘similar child’.3 We shall examine each of
these elements in turn.
What	is	‘significant	harm’?	
What does ‘significant harm’ mean in English Child Law
in the context of  child protection?  This is a matter for the
interpretation of  the Courts since the Children Act 1989
offers no statutory definition of  the concept of  ‘significant
harm’ as such.  However, there is a statutory definition of
‘harm’ under the Children  Act 1989,  which, under s.31(9)
thereof, is described as ‘ ill-treatment or the impairment of
health or development including, for example, impairment
suffered from seeing or hearing the ill-treatment of  another.’
The traditional starting point has been the definition of
‘significant’ by Booth, J , who, citing the Oxford English
Dictionary , described it as ‘considerable, noteworthy,
important’.4 The advice of  Hedley, J is also worth noting,
*Professor of  Law, Liverpool John Moores University.
1 This article is an expanded and updated version of  the paper delivered at the Conference ‘Culture, Dispute Resolution and the
Modernised Family’ at the conference of  the International Centre for Family Law, Policy and Practice held at Kings College, London
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2 [2016] EWHC 11 (Fam).
3 Section 31(10) Children Act 1989 declares: Where the question of  whether harm suffered by a child is significant turns on the child’s
health or development, his heath and development shall be compared with that which could reasonably be expected of  a similar child’.  
4 See Booth, J in Humberside CC v B [1994] 1 FLR 297
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when he observes that in this context, ‘to be significant, the
harm must be something unusual; at least something more
than commonplace human failure or inadequacy.’ 5
However, he goes on to say that it would be ‘unwise to a
degree to attempt an all-embracing definition of  significant
harm’ and that the term is ‘fact specific’ and must retain the
breadth of  meaning that human fallibility may require of  it.6
Lord Wilson echoes this view in the Supreme Court
case of  Re B by saying that ‘In my view this court should
avoid attempting to explain the word ‘significant’; it would
be a gloss; attention might then turn to the meaning of  the
gloss and albeit with the best of  intentions, the court might
find in due course that they had travelled far from the word
itself.’7
Interpreting ‘similar child’
Whilst there is no statutory definition of  ‘similar child’,
the Department of  Health Guidance to the Children Act
1989, Vol. 1, has suggested that the ‘meaning of  similar
child will require judicial interpretation but may need to take
account of  environmental, cultural and social characteristics
of  the child…the standard should only be that which it is
reasonable to expect for the particular child rather than the
best that could possibly be achieved.’  
The two-stage test in Care proceedings
In order for a care (or supervision) order to be made, a
Court has to consider the application for a care order in
two stages: First, the threshold stage where there has to be
sufficient reason to suggest that the threshold as stipulated
under s.31(2) has been crossed, i.e. that there are sufficient
facts to suggest  that significant harm has been caused to
the child or the circumstances suggest that significant harm
will be suffered by the child in the future; or circumstances
show the child is beyond  parental control. 
At the second stage, known as the welfare stage, even if
the threshold has been crossed, the Court must consider
whether it would be in the child’s best interests to make an
order. If  it is not, then no order should be made. 
The relevance of Human Rights
Both Art. 8 and Art 6 of  the European Convention of
Human Rights are relevant to this area of  the law in that
Article 8 deals with ‘interference’ with the right to respect
for family life and Article 6 deals with the right to a fair
trial/hearing.  Case-law suggests that a decision about the
threshold does not engage Art 8 since a consequence that
the threshold is crossed merely opens the gateway to the
making of  order.8 Once the court decides to make statutory
orders, Article 8 is engaged and comes into play. If  the
parents are not given adequate time to know the nature of
the allegations against them and therefore cannot prepare
their defence adequately, then Article 6 might be engaged.9
Meeting the threshold: Guidelines in Re B
In the leading 2013 case of  Re B10 the Supreme Court
confirmed that a decision as to whether the threshold
conditions have been satisfied depends on an evaluation of
the facts of  the case as found by the judge. It is not an
exercise of  discretion.  
The oft-quoted words of  Lady Hale in Re B11 cast some
light on meeting the threshold: 
‘I agree entirely that it is the statute and the statute alone
that the courts have to apply, and that judicial explanation
or expansion is at best an imperfect guide. I agree also that
parents, children and families are so infinitely various that
that the law must be flexible enough to cater for frailties as
yet unimagined even by the most experienced family judge.
Nevertheless, where the threshold is in dispute, courts
might find it helpful to bear the following in mind:
The court’s task is not to improve on nature or
even to secure that every child has a happy and
fulfilled life, but to be satisfied that the statutory
threshold has been crossed. 
When deciding whether the threshold is
crossed the court should identify, as precisely as
possible, the nature of  the harm which the child
is suffering or is likely to suffer. This is
particularly important where the child has not yet
suffered any, or any significant harm and where
the harm which is feared is the impairment of
intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural
development.
Significant harm is harm which is
“considerable, noteworthy or important”. The
court should identify why and in what respects
the harm is significant. Again, this may be
particularly important where the harm in
question is the impairment of  intellectual,
emotional, social or behavioural development
which has not yet happened.
The harm has to be attributable to a lack, or
likely lack, of  reasonable parental care, not simply
to the characters and personalities of  both the
child and her parents. So, once again, the court
should identify the respects in which parental
care is falling (or likely to fall) short of  what it
would be reasonable to expect.
Finally, where harm has not yet been suffered,
5 See Hedley, J in Re L (Care: Threshold Criteria) [2007] 1 FLR 2050 para. 51
6 ibid.
7 See Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33 para. 26.
8 See Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC at paras. 29, 62, 129 and 186.
9 As could be argued in Re LW [2016] EWHC 11.
10 Re B (A Child) [2013] UKSC 33. 
11 See Re B, ibid at para 193.
12 See Re MA (Care Threshold) [2009] EWCA 253; [2010] 1 FLR 431. 
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the court must consider the degree of  likelihood
that it will be suffered in the future. This will entail
considering the degree of  likelihood that the
parents’ future behaviour will amount to a lack of
reasonable parental care. It will also entail
considering the relationship between the
significance of  the harm feared and the likelihood
that it will occur. Simply to state that there is a
“risk” is not enough. The court has to be satisfied,
by relevant and sufficient evidence, that the harm
is likely: see in re J [2013] 2 WLR 649.’
Proving Significant Harm: Some problem Cases 
In recent case law, while lower courts have been willing to
have children taken into care upon proof  of  sufficient
evidence of  significant harm having been or about to be
committed, the Court of  Appeal in Re MA has shown a
reluctance to make care orders for a child where it has been
argued that the possible past abuse of  the sibling of  the child
in question can found the basis of  placing that child into
care.12 Similarly, the gist of  the Supreme Court’s approach in
Re J is that the threshold criteria can only be established on the
basis of  facts proved to be true on the balance of  probabilities
not on the basis of  suspicions. 13
These cases have been criticised by academics, calling the
decision of  Re MA, in particular a ‘staggering’ decision, in the
words of  the dissenting judge,  Wilson LJ (as he then was). 14
The Impact of high-profile child abuse scandals on social work
practice
It would appear that the impact of  high-profile child
abuse scandals has been a series of  child abuse Inquiries,
some producing not simply reports, identifying a catalogue
of  failures by the local authorities and child protection
services,  but also containing long lists of
recommendations15. Some of  these, for example from the
Victoria Climbie Report, have actually resulted in new
legislation, namely the Children Act 2004, which, inter alia,
has strengthened the statutory basis on which the various
child protection agencies are required to co-operate with
each other.   In the past few years, the increased frequency
of  reported cases where local authorities have failed to
protect vulnerable children has resulted in a surge of  care
applications.  This could well explain the willingness of  the
local authorities to apply to place so many babies in care, as
a reaction to the many reported cases where such measures
were not taken. It should perhaps be borne in mind that in
the Baby P case, legal advice was given that there were
insufficient grounds to issue care proceedings which with
hindsight has proved  to be at best misplaced and at worst,
incorrect advice. This could have been as a result of
confusion between the grounds for care proceedings and
the grounds for interim care orders.16 However, regardless
of  the reason for the advice given, both local authorities
and the lower courts now seem to be more willing to be
more proactive and not run the risk of  having failed to act
in time to protect the child.  
Statistics on Children taken into care at birth: 2008-2014 
Family court records were studied by researchers at
Lancaster University, Brunel University , London University
and the Tavistock and Portman NHS Trust. They found
that in 2008, a total of  802 babies were taken into local
authority care, rising in 2013 to 2,018 babies at birth or
soon afterwards. Between 2007 and 2014, a total of  13,248
babies were removed by Local Authorities.  The number of
new born babies taken away with the approval of  the family
courts has soared by 150% in five years, with a third
removed from women in their teens. One mother had 16
babies removed from her one after another, and is still of
child-bearing age. The number of  new born babies taken
away by family courts has increased 2.5 times in five years.
It has also been reported 17 that only 1 in 10 of  those babies
was ever returned to its mother.   
It has been argued by Broadhurst and Mason that their
research indicates that the State reinforces parents’ exclusion,
where the full range of  challenges  these parents face is  poorly
understood. They emphasise that the continued high volume
of  children entering state care is also taking place in
international jurisdictions such as the USA and Australia,  and
that recent empirical evidence from England suggests that a
sizeable proportion of  birth parents who appear as
respondents in the family court are repeat clients. 18 The
impact of  such removal in terms of  emotional loss and social
stigma where it is not a clear-cut case of  needing to protect
highly vulnerable children is perhaps yet to be fully
understood and remains controversial.   
Cases on Removal of babies at birth: Re LW
In the 2016 case of  Nottingham City Council v LW & Ors19
the judge posed the question: how long can a Local
Authority wait before issuing care proceedings for
13 See Re J (2013) UKSC 9.
14 See eg Hayes, J, Hayes, M & Williams, J ‘ ‘Shocking abuse followed by a ‘staggering’ ruling: Re MA (Care Threshold)’ [2010] Family Law 166.
15 See The Victoria Climbie Inquiry. Report of  an Inquiry by Lord Laming (2003) HMSO contained 108 recommendations while the subsequent
Report by Lord Laming nearly 6 years later, largely precipitated by the death of  Baby P (Peter Connelly),  contained 58 recommendations:
see The Protection of  Children in England: A Report (2009).
16 A suggestion made by Jacqui Gilliat in ‘The Interim Removal of  Children from their parents Updated: Emergency Protection Orders,
Interim Care Orders and the Baby P Effect’ (2009) Family Law Week at www.familylawweek.co.uk . 
17 See The Guardian; the Mail online, 14 December 2015.
18 See Broadhurst, K and Mason, C  ‘Birth Parents  and the Collateral Consequences of  Court-ordered Child Removal: Towards a
Comprehensive Framework’  (2017) 31 International Journal of  Law, Policy and the Family 41..
19 [2016] EWHC 11 (Fam).
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removing a new born baby? 
The case was focused on a baby girl who was the subject
of  care proceedings issued by Nottingham City Council,
which argued that the baby was at risk of  suffering
significant harm if  she remained in the care of  either of
her parents on her discharge from hospital. This was
because there was concern over the parents’ reported drug
taking and domestic violence in their relationship which
consequently posed a threat of  harm the child would be at
risk of  suffering.  Children services had been involved with
the family for two years and care proceedings had been
issued for a half  sibling who had subsequently been placed
with his grandparents with his mother’s consent.  
The first hearing of  the present case came before
Keehan J,  when the child was 12 days old,  and the learned
judge had to determine whether the baby should be
removed from her parents and placed in foster care under
an Interim Care Order (ICO). The parents contested the
application.
Given the allegations against the parents and in view of
the removal of  the baby’s sibling, Keehan J was satisfied
that the interim threshold was met.20 He made the Interim
Care Order with a plan for removal and directed supervised
contact to take place each weekday.   He was compelled to
take this course in the ‘best welfare interests of  the baby’.
The baby was born on 16 January and the hospital notified
the social workers of  her birth on 18 January. However, it
took the social workers until 21 January to place the
necessary papers before the local authority’s solicitors for
consideration of  the issue of  care proceedings. It then took
a local authority solicitor until 28 January to issue care
proceedings and to apply for an ‘urgent’ interim care order.  
These facts led the learned judge to make several
comments, highlighting the Local Authority’s failings and
poor practice, lamenting the fact that ‘fundamental and
egregious errors’ were made in what he considered was  ‘a
run of  the mill case’,  and that such errors were not isolated
examples. 
The judge in this case was extremely critical of  the
length of  time taken by the local authority to issue
proceedings and described these ‘egregious errors’ in some
detail.  First, there was the question of  the late issue of
proceedings. The hospital had notified the social workers of
the birth but they then took three days to notify their legal
department and it took them another seven days before
they issued proceedings. However,  it was explained that
the reason for the delay was largely due to the local
authority awaiting medical information pertaining to
allegations that the baby was suffering withdrawal
symptoms from methadone taken by the mother during
pregnancy and therefore needed monitoring, and that the
father had taken a drugs overdose which necessitated him
being admitted to hospital. The delay was compounded by
the fact that once the medical report had been provided, it
was not picked up by the social worker who was on sick
leave but although the report had been sent to the local
authority lawyer, it was again not picked up as she was
absent from the office. 
Second, another criticism levelled by the learned judge
was that the local authority did not provide the parent’s
solicitors with their application and supporting evidence
until two and a half  hours before the hearing, resulting in
the parents having insufficient time to consider their
position and prepare their case.  Another consequence of
the late issue of  the application meant that the child’s
guardian could undertake only ‘rudimentary enquiries’
having only being appointed shortly before the hearing.
Indeed, the parents sought to challenge the case but were
hampered in doing so by the late service of  evidence.
In the light of  these errors, the Court took the unusual
step of  ordering Nottingham County Council to pay the
costs of  the publicly funded parties.  
Keehan J chose to emphasise the following points:
The period of  time for which a hospital is
prepared to keep a new born baby may be a
material consideration for a local authority in
relation to the timing of  an Interim Care Order
(ICO) application –but one must not place too
great a reliance on these indications, particularly as:
a hospital may not detain a baby in hospital
against the wishes of  parents with Parental
Responsibility;
the capability of  a maternity unit or hospital to
accommodate a new born baby may change
within hours;
police protection orders and emergency
protection orders are emergency remedies but
they do not afford the parents nor the child the
same degree of  participation, representation and
protection as an on-notice ICO application;
the indication of  a maternity unit as to date of
discharge should not normally set or lead the
time for an ICO application.
Where there is a pre-birth plan in place that
provides for removal of  a new born baby, it is
‘essential and best practice’21 for the ICO
application to be made on the day of  the child’s
birth.
The availability of  additional evidence from the
maternity unit or elsewhere must not cause delay
in the issue of  care proceedings –rather the
‘provision of  additional evidence may be
envisaged in the application and/or provided
subsequently. 22
He set out five basic points of  good practice:
The birth plan should be rigorously adhered to
20 i.e. that ‘At an interim stage, the removal of  children from their parents is not to be sanctioned unless the child’s safety requires
interim protection.’  This comes from the Court of  Appeal in Re L-A [2009] EWCA Civ 822. 
21 See Nottingham CC  v LW and ors [2016] EWHC 2011 at para.31.
22 ibid at para 32.
– International Family Law, Policy and Practice • Vol. 5.1 •Spring 2017 • page 23 –
by social workers, managers and local authority
legal departments; in the actual case, there was a
pre-birth plan but  ‘this was not worth the paper
it was written on’ because it was ‘ignored  by
everyone connected with the local authority’.23
A risk assessment of  the mother and the father
should be commenced immediately upon the
social workers being made aware of  the mother’s
pregnancy, and the assessment completed at least
4 weeks before the mother’s expected date of
delivery. The assessment should then be updated
to take account of  relevant events immediately
pre- and post-delivery, which could potentially
affect the initial conclusions on risk and care
planning for the unborn child;
The assessment should be disclosed forthwith
upon initial completion, to the parents and, if
instructed, to their solicitors to give them an
opportunity, if  necessary, to challenge the
assessment of  risk and the proposed care plan;
The social work team should provide all
relevant documentation necessary, for the legal
department to issue care proceedings and the
application for an interim care order, no less than
seven days before the expected date of  delivery.
The legal department must issue the application
on the day of  birth and, in any event, no later
than 24 hours  after birth (or, as the case may be,
the date on which the local authority is notified
of  the birth);
Immediately upon issue, if  not before, the local
authority’s solicitors should have served the
applications and supporting documents on the
parents and , if  instructed, upon their respective
solicitors;
Immediately upon issue, the local authority
should seek an initial hearing date, at the best
time estimate that can at that time be provided. 
Hence, he emphasised that ‘the message must go out
loud and clear that, save in the most exceptional and
unusual of  circumstances, local authorities must make
applications for public law proceedings in respect of  new
born babies timeously and, especially where the
circumstances arguably require the removal of  the child
from its parent(s), within at most five days of  the child’s
birth’24 with failures “to act fairly and/or
timeously…condemned in an order for costs”.25
Other historic case law on new born babies taken into care at birth or
soon after
Case law on the Re LW scenario can be traced back to
at least 1987 and the infamous ‘drug baby’ case of  Re D26,
where a baby whose mother who had been addicted to
drugs for ten years and was a registered drug addict gave
birth prematurely to a baby boy suffering from convulsions
and  drug withdrawal symptoms. The baby’s father was also
a drug addict. The Local Authority obtained a care order
(under pre-Children Act 1989 legislation) to remove the
child soon after its birth and the baby was placed in
intensive care.  After six weeks the child was placed with
foster parents by the Local Authority . The Local Authority
then applied for a care order under the legislation of  the
time.27
The parents challenged the care order which was
eventually affirmed by the House of  Lords.  Since this was
in the pre-Children Act era, the Law Lords interpreted the
legislation of  the time (under the Children and Young
Persons Act 1969) which required that meaning that the
children could be removed if  the child’s proper
development ‘is being’ avoidably prevented, to refer to as
part of  a continuum or continuing state of  circumstances
and therefore the Courts could look at events surrounding
the welfare of  the child not just in the present but also in
the past and in the future. Under the Children Act 1989, of
course, the words of  s.31 (2) thereof  would cover the Re D
scenario as it is worded widely enough to protect past,
present and the likelihood of  future harm. 
Removal for different reasons: The Kirklees  Case  o f
CZ
In a totally different scenario, it was reported on 16
February 201728 that social workers had removed a week-
old baby into care because the father had expressed
‘unorthodox‘ views about the need to sterilise feeding
bottles.  A family court judge awarded the couple and their
son , who is now 15 months old, a total of   £11,250, after
ruling that Kirklees Council had breached the couple’s
human rights and  misled a judge in a bid to remove the
child from their care. 
The case of  CZ 29 involved a couple in their mid-
twenties, who cannot be identified. They both suffer from
mild learning difficulties and have received assistance from
adult social care workers for about a decade.  Mr Justice
Cobb said that the couple had not been referred to social
services ahead of  the baby’s birth, in November 2015,
despite the fact that the mother suffers from minor mental
health problems and the father ‘had displayed aggressive
behaviour’.  The child (CZ) was born by emergency
caesarean section and was briefly placed in a Special Care
23 Ibid at para.10. 
24 Nottingham CC (above) [2016] EWHC at para. 41.
25 Ibid at para. 42.
26 See Re D (A Minor) [1987] 1 AER 20 ; 1 FLR 422 (also known as The Berkshire Case).
27 i.e. under the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (now repealed).
28 See The Telegraph, 16 February 2017.
29 See AZ, BZ , CZ v Kirklees Council [2017] EWFC 11; [2017]1 WLR 2467 .
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Unit after his birth because he was losing weight and was
slow to feed. According the hospital’s health visitor, the
baby’s loss of  weight was due to the circumstances of  his
birth and was not the parents’ fault. Nevertheless, four days
after the child was born, hospital staff  called the council to
raise concerns about ‘the long-term parenting capacity of
this mother and father.’  
Cobb, J said: ‘It was suggested that the mother had no
family support, and that the father was expressing
unorthodox views about the need for sterilisation of
bottles, and was heard praising the benefits of  formula
milk.’ Social workers then sought an emergency hearing to
place the child under the care of  its paternal grandmother
but did not inform the parents that the hearing was taking
place, and wrongly told the judge that the couple had been
informed. They also ‘forgot to notify’ CAFCASS. The
council removed the baby into care when the child was
seven days old.  
The learned judge declared : ‘The failure of  the local
authority to notify the Claimants that the hearing was taking
place on the afternoon of  13 November was particularly
egregious; misleading the district judge no fewer than three
times that the parents knew of  the hearing aggravates the
culpability yet further.’
He continued, ‘There is no doubt in my mind, indeed it
is admitted, that Kirklees Council breached the human
rights of  a baby boy and his parents. I am satisfied that the
breaches were serious…the separation of  a baby from his
parents represents a very serious interference with family
life.’  
He stated that it was ‘questionable that there was a
proper case for asserting that CZ’s immediate safety
demanded separation from his parents at all.’30
The family accumulated legal aid bills of  nearly £80,000
while Kirklees Council had costs of  around £40,000. This
was criticised by the learned judge as ‘unwarranted
expenditure’ of  the law firms involved in the case.  The
judge awarded the mother, father and baby £3,750 each but
said that as they did not ‘conscientiously attempt to settle
their claim, they were unlikely to receive those sums because
the funds were likely to be recouped by the Legal Aid
Agency’.   
Comments on the Threshold Criteria
The criticisms of  the threshold criteria are well-known,
namely, that interpreting s.31(2) of  the Children Act 1989
has become legalistic and requires a degree of  subjective
assessment by the courts; constant interpretation of  its
component parts is required and the threshold is arguably
set too high to protect as many children as possible.  It is
strongly recommended that the previously detailed
Guidance on the threshold criteria from previous versions
of  this publication be reinstated to a prominent position in
Working Together 2015 rather than in supplementary
documents, while the emphasis in Working Together 2015 of
the concept of  ‘serious harm’.  The debate will no doubt
continue on whether the threshold for interim care orders
is too high or too low.31
Concluding comments 
The Nottingham case (Re LW) appears to be a clear-cut
scenario for court approval of  removal of  a new born baby
by virtue of  its risk of  suffering significant harm from its
parents.  In the light of  the facts of  the case, the judge’s
approach in this instance appears to be totally justified.
However, the judicial approach to applications for such
removal may not be so straightforward in other cases.  It is
arguable that in the light of  cases like Re MA and Re J, the
courts at the highest level appear to be far more cautious
about removal of  children from their families purely on the
basis of  a history of  sibling removal or if  there does not
appear to be cogent evidence of  past significant harm.
Even a real possibility that a parent had harmed another
child in the past would not be sufficient to establish the
likelihood that the child who was the subject of  the present
proceedings would necessarily be harmed in the future.
Mere suspicion cannot be relied upon to establish the
threshold criteria, only proof  that the significant harm had
actually taken place. Nevertheless, the lower courts do not
seem to have any qualms about removing babies from their
mothers at birth where the evidence looks reasonably
convincing at the interim care order stage, as Re LW
demonstrates.
We therefore appear to have reached a polarised state in
law and social work where, when it comes to the removal of
babies at birth, the lower courts seem to be far more willing
to do so, sometimes for somewhat dubious reasons, as in
CZ, whereas in the light of  their cautionary approach in
relation to applications to place children in care on the basis
of  possible past abuse of  siblings in the same family, the
higher appellate courts do not appear to as easily convinced
that the threshold has been crossed.  The question therefore
remains as to whether section 31(2) should be amended to
‘lack of  reasonable care’ or a similar broader standard of
care. However, this would immediately open the door to
criticisms of  further debates over what the new phrase
means in any given case.  It could be argued that the most
concerning aspect of  the spate of  court ordered removals,
child removals at birth is the age of  the mothers concerned
(predominantly teenagers) and the implication that this has
now become a cultural phenomenon rather than a purely
episodic occurrence. This does not augur well for any future
amendments to the law and perhaps these cases reflect a
deeper set of  social problems encountered by these young
mothers in particular which no amount of  legislation can
resolve on its own. 
30 See AZ, BZ, CZ [2017]  EWFC 11 (above) at para.41.
31 See  Howe, D,  ‘ Removal of  Children at Interim Hearings: Is the test  now set too high?’ [2009] Fam Law 321 , contrasted with
Bainham, A ‘ Interim Care Orders: Is the Bar set too Low?’ [2011]  Fam Law 374.
